Entries by Michael Atkins (1064)
Just in time for Halloween, a Seattle Dispute Over Screams.com Domain Name
Excerpt of plaintiff’s Web site
accessible through the disputed screams.com domain name
Just in time for Oct. 31, there’s a spooky domain name dispute brewing right here in Seattle.
Last month, Happy Halloween, Inc., sued Screams, LLC, asking the Western District for a declaration that its registration of the screams.com domain name does not constitute cybersquatting or infringe Screams’ registration of SCREAMS as a trademark in connection with “amusement park services, namely, a Halloween theme park including haunted houses, haunted hayrides, drama exhibitions and amusements.”
Both parties offer “haunted house” services. Happy Halloween runs the “Cutting Edge Haunted House” in Ft. Worth, Texas. Screams operates the “Screams Halloween Theme Park” in Waxahachie, Texas, also near Dallas-Ft. Worth.
In July, a National Arbitration Forum panelist found in favor of Screams in a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy arbitration and ordered screams.com to be transferred to Screams.
Happy Halloween points the domain name to its Web site located at www.cuttingedgehauntedhouse.com. It argues that “screams” is generic and that it did not register screams.com in bad faith.
It also argues it registered the domain name on Jan. 22, 1997, so any conflicting rights Screams might have in the mark are barred by laches.
Happy Halloween filed in the Western District because it registered screams.com through Vancouver-based Dotster, Inc., which is located in this district.
Screams has not yet answered Happy Halloween’s complaint.
The case cite is Happy Halloween, Inc. v. Screams, LLC, No. 11-1513 (W.D. Wash.).
Western District Finds Glassybaby's Trade Dress is Generic
Generic! The Western District finds Glassybaby’s
design (left) is incapable of functioning as a trademark
Glassybaby’s popular votive candle holder design is generic.
The Western District made that finding on Sept. 30, granting the motion for summary judgment that defendant Provide Gifts, Inc., d/b/a Red Envelope, brought attacking Glassybaby, LLC’s trade dress claim.
Western District Judge Marsha Pechman previously had dismissed the Seattle company’s complaint against the defendant sellers and manufacturers of competing votive designs for failing to describe its claimed trade dress. (STL post here.) After allowing Glassybaby to amend its complaint, the court found the company wrongly relied on the Patent and Trademark Office’s conclusion that Glassybaby’s trade dress was not generic.
“Glassybaby’s trade dress is generic and incapable of trademark protection. The mark describes the rough dimensions of a round glass container with convex sides, a thick, clear base, and a wide top. The mark only answers the question ‘what-are-you’ not ‘who-are-you.’ It gives no indication of the source and merely describes on particular species of the genus of round containers. Permitting trade dress protection for this item would also unnecessarily grant Glassybaby protection over a broad number and types of small, round containers, which runs contrary to the principles behind extending Lanham Act protection to trade dress. This is similar to the outcome in a case before the Second Circuit, relied on by Defendants: Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Gregor, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995). The court there found die-cut greeting cards cut in the outline of color photographs of an animal, person, or object were generic because the product design only described a species of a genus, not a source-identifying trade dress. Here, with even less concrete detail of the product, nothing about the unregistered trademark identifies the source of what is simply a type of round, glass container approximately 3.75 inches high and 2.5 inches wide. This is simply a species of the genus of round containers and is generic as a matter of law.
“Glassybaby has not raised any dispute of material fact showing that its trade dress is not generic. Glassybaby primarily relies on the PTO’s finding that the unregistered trade dress is not generic. Yet, nowhere has Glassybaby explained why the Court is bound by that determination. At best, in a direct appeal from the PTO, which this is not, the Court reviews the PTO’s findings for substantial evidence. Here, the PTO’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence and fails to consider or apply the relevant authority. The PTO merely concluded that ‘products that combine the curved sides and thick, clear base with the specified dimensions [presented by Glassybaby] do not appear to be so commonly available for sale as to support a finding that the mark is generic.’ The PTO does not strictly apply the legal test for genericness or explain why the number of similarly sized and shaped votives impacts the determination of genericness. The PTO’s conclusion is at odds with Ninth Circuit law. A trade dress for a product design that answers only the ‘what-is-it’ question is generic. The Court is convinced Glassybaby cannot pass this test with its trade dress, regardless of whether there [are] abundant or few similarly sized and shaped glass containers. The PTO’s finding does not suffice to raise a genuine issue of fact.”
The court dismissed Glassybaby’s claims for dilution and violation of the Consumer Protection Act for the same reasons.
The court’s finding could have a big impact on Glassybaby. Its conclusion that the company’s product design is incapable of protection would seem to allow competitors — under trademark principles at least — to copy Glassybaby’s trendy design without liability.
The New York Times last week coincidentally featured Glassybaby’s challenges in breaking into the New York market. The company may face an even more significant challenge following the court’s order.
The case cite is Glassybaby, LLC v. Provide Gifts, Inc., No. 11-380 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2011) (Pechman, J.).
Western District Pares Back Big Jury Award in Hendrix Trademark Dispute
I’ve been busy!
That’s my excuse for not staying more on top of recent developments in the Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., litigation involving use of Jimi Hendrix’s name and likeness in connection with the sale of art. The case has had some big implications along the way, including the Western District’s finding that portions of the Washington right of publicity statute are unconstitutional (STL post here).
Long story short, the case went to trial. After motions for summary judgment and settlement of defendants’ state law counterclaims, the only issues that remained were plaintiffs’ damages on their trademark infringement claim; defendants’ liability for violating Washington’s Consumer Protection Act; and the damages that flowed from any such violation.
On May 9, the jury found for plaintiffs. After a 3+ day trial, the jury deliberated for 1.5 hours and awarded plaintiffs $306,650 in lost profits and $60,000 in defendants’ profits on the infringement claim; and $750,000 in injury to reputation, $300,000 in injury to goodwill, and $306,650 in lost profits on the CPA claim.
Defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, arguing that much of the damages award was not supported by the evidence. They did not challenge the jury’s award of defendants’ profits or their liability under the CPA. Plaintiffs moved for treble damages under the CPA and for attorney’s fees.
On Sept. 21, Western District Judge Thomas Zilly pared back most of the jury’s award. He granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted their motion for a new trial in the event an appeal results in the being case remanded. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for treble damages and granted in part and denied in part their motion for attorney’s fees.
In the end, the court entered judgment against defendants imposing a permanent injunction and awarding $60,000 representing the undisputed amount of defendants’ profits attributable to their trademark infringement, plus $50,000, constituting reasonable attorney’s fees under the CPA, for a total award of $110,000.
Perhaps most interesting is the observation that businesses do not have “reputations”; they only have “goodwill,” so the award of damages for both reputation and goodwill elements was improper. The court also found the amount of the awards was based purely on speculation.
“[C]ontrary to plaintiffs’ position, Washington courts have consistently defined reputation as merely one component of a business’s goodwill. Similarly, Washington’s Department of Labor and Industries has explained by way of regulation that goodwill is ‘the value of a trade or business based on expected continued customer patronage due to its name, reputation, or any other factor.’.
“Thus, the Court’s unchallenged supplemental instruction to the jury that reputation and goodwill are synonymous comports with Washington law, as well as the observation by a district court in our circuit that business entities do not have reputations per se, but rather have goodwill. The jury’s verdict awarding vastly different amounts for injury to reputation and injury to goodwill cannot be reconciled with the Court’s instruction that, for a business, reputation and goodwill are the same thing.
“If these duplicative awards were supported by substantial evidence, the Court would face the difficult task of crafting an appropriate remedy, whether it be striking one award in favor of the other, offering plaintiffs the option of either accepting a remittitur or submitting to a new trial, or simply requiring a new trial. The Court need not, however, engage in such analysis because the damages at issue are based entirely on speculation. The jury was provided no evidence from which it could determine the diminution in value, if any, of plaintiffs’ goodwill as a result of defendants’ violation of the CPA. Plaintiffs proffered no estimate, by way of expert testimony or otherwise, of the value of their goodwill either before or after defendants’ wrongful conduct. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded during discussions concerning the related jury instructions that ‘[t]here’s not a specific number in evidence.’”
The case cite is Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., No. 09-285, 2011 WL 4402775 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2011) (Zilly, J.).
NYT Discusses Trademark Bullying, Though Its Example Case is Questionable
I don’t usually post on Fridays, but I thought I’d be remiss if I didn’t point out the NYT article yesterday on trademark bullying.
It led into the issue using Procter & Gamble’s objection to a startup’s use of WILLA based on P&G’s prior use of WELLA, both in connection with personal care products.
The article’s definitely worth a look, but I’m not sure WELLA vs. WILLA is the best example of trademark bullying — even if P&G is big and the startup is small. That said, P&G didn’t do itself any favors when its cease-and-desist letter threatened if the startup didn’t immediately drop its mark, P&G would pursue “lengthy and expensive alternative measures.”
Interestingly, the article states the startup expects to pay $750k defending its right to use the mark.
Trademark bullying or no, if I were a startup, there’s no way I could justify spending that kind of cash defending my right to use my chosen mark. I also question whether the startup did a trademark search to see whether its contemplated mark was likely to get it into this kind of scrape before it invested in the mark. (The startup chose WILLA because it’s the name of the owner’s daughter.) Sentiment aside, I can’t imagine the fight is worth it.
New Guide to Appellate Practice in Washington Helps Non-Specialists
We’re more about federal court at STL, but once in a while someone brings a trademark, unfair competition, or Consumer Protection Act claim in state court.
That means it pays to know a little something about state court appeals.
Appellate lawyer David Corbett (left) has a new guide that fits the bill. His ”Questions and Answers About Civil Appeals in the Washington State Court of Appeals” is a practical road map to what non-appellate specialists and their clients need to know about civil appeals in Washington.
When I say it’s a “practical” resource, I mean it. It starts with the considerations that go into whether one should appeal. What’s it going to cost? What are the chances of success? How long will it take? It even provides a cost-benefit analysis that could have come from someone with a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard. Wait… Mr. Corbett has a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard! Fortunately, he wrote his manual like the persuasive lawyer that he is. Which is why his chapter on “Persuading the Court of Appeals” is well worth a read.
Mr. Corbett’s guide is available on his Web site, including in PDF form. It’s worth a bunch, but he’s making it available for free.